For over a
century, liberals and radicals have seen the possibility of change in
capitalist systems from one of two perspectives: the reform tradition assumes
that corporate institutions remain central to the system but believes that
regulatory policies can contain, modify, and control corporations and their
political allies. The revolutionary tradition assumes that change can come
about only if corporate institutions are eliminated or transcended during an
acute crisis, usually but not always by violence.
But what happens if a system neither reforms nor collapses in crisis?
Quietly, a
different kind of progressive change is emerging, one that involves a
transformation in institutional structures and power, a process one could call
“evolutionary reconstruction.” At the height of the financial crisis in early
2009, some kind of nationalization of the banks seemed possible. “The public
hates bankers right now,” the Brookings Institution's Douglas Elliot observed.
“Truthfully, you would find considerable support for hanging a number of
bankers…” It was a moment, Barack Obama told banking CEOs, when his
administration was “the only thing between you and the pitchforks.” But the
president opted for a soft bailout engineered by Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner and White House economic adviser Lawrence Summers. Whereas Franklin
Roosevelt attacked the “economic royalists” and built and mobilized his
political base, Obama entered office with an already organized base and largely
ignored it.
When the next
financial crisis occurs, and it will, a different political opportunity may be
possible. One option has already been put on the table: in 2010, thirty-three
senators voted to break up large Wall Street investment banks that were “too
big to fail.” Such a policy would not only reduce financial vulnerability; it
would alter the structure of institutional power.
Still, breaking
up banks, even if successful, isn't the end of the process. The modern history
of the financial industry, to say nothing of anti-trust strategies in general,
suggests that the big banks would ultimately regroup and reconcentrate and
restore their domination of the system. So what can be done when “breaking them
up” fails?
The potentially
explosive power of public anger at financial institutions surfaced in May 2010
when the Senate voted by a 96-0 margin to audit the Federal Reserve's lending
(a provision included ultimately in the Dodd-Frank legislation, which was
designed to protect American taxpayers and consumers from financial corruption
and to make the financial system more accountable)—something that had never
been done before. Traditional reforms have aimed at improved regulation, higher
reserve requirements, and the channeling of credit to key sectors. But future
crises may feature a spectrum of sophisticated proposals for more radical
change offered by figures on both the left and right. For instance, a “Limited
Purpose Banking” strategy put forward by conservative economist Laurence
Kolticoff would impose a 100-percent reserve requirement on banks. Because
banks typically provide loans in amounts many times their reserves, this would
transform them into modest institutions with little or no capacity to finance
speculation. It would also nationalize the creation of all new money as federal
authorities, rather than the banks, would directly control system-wide
financial flows. A variety of respected liberal as well as conservative
economists have welcomed this strategy—including five Nobel laureates in
economics.
On the left, the
economist Fred Moseley has proposed that for banks deemed too big to fail
“permanent nationalization with bonds-to-stocks swaps for bondholders is the
most equitable solution…” Nationally owned banks, he argues, would provide a
basis for “a more stable and public-oriented banking system in the future.”
Most striking is the argument of Willem Buiter, the chief economist of
Citigroup no less, that if the public underwrites the costs of bailouts, “banks
should be in public ownership…” In fact, had the taxpayer funds used to bail
out major financial institutions in 2007–2010 been provided on condition that
voting stock be issued in return for the investment, one or more major banks
would, in fact, have become essentially publicly controlled banks.
Unknown to most
Americans, there have been a large number of small and medium-sized public
banking institutions for some time now. They have financed small businesses,
renewable energy, co-ops, housing, infrastructure, and other specifically
targeted areas. There are also 7,500 community-based credit unions. Further
precedents for public banking range from Small Business Administration loans to
the activities of the US-dominated World Bank. In fact, the federal government
already operates 140 banks and quasi-banks that provide loans and loan
guarantees for an extraordinary range of domestic and international economic
activities. Through its various farm, housing, electricity, cooperative and
other loans, the Department of Agriculture alone operates the equivalent of the
seventh largest bank in America.
The economic
crisis has also produced widespread interest in the Bank of North Dakota, a
highly successful state-owned bank founded in 1919 when the state was governed
by legislators belonging to the left-populist Nonpartisan League. Over the past
fourteen years, the bank has returned $340 million in profits to the state and
has broad support in the business community as well as among progressive
activists. Legislative proposals to establish banks patterned in whole or in
part on the North Dakota model have been put forward by activists and
legislators in Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Montana,
Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Maryland, Virginia, Maine, and Massachusetts. In
Oregon, with strong support from a coalition of farmers, small-business owners,
and community bankers, and backed by State Treasurer Ted Wheeler, a variation
on the theme, “a virtual state bank” (that is, one that has no storefronts but
channels state-backed capital to support other banks) is likely to be formed in
the near future. How far the various strategies may develop is likely to depend
on the intensity of future financial crises, the degree of social and economic
pain and political anger in general, and the capacity of a new politics to focus
citizen anger in support of major institutional reconstruction and
democratization.
That a long era
of social and economic austerity and failing reform might paradoxically open
the way to more populist or radical institutional change—including various
forms of public ownership—but also suggested by emerging developments in health
care. Here the next stage of change is already under way. At first, it is
likely to be harmful. Republican efforts to cut back the mostly unrealized
benefits of the Affordable Care Act, passed in 2010, provide one example of
this. The first stages, however, are not likely to be the last. Polls show
overwhelming distrust of and deep hostility toward insurance companies. We can
also expect public outrage to be fueled by stories like that of
fifty-nine-year-old James Verone who attempted to rob a bank in Gastonia, North
Carolina this year—but only, he made clear, for one dollar. The reason:
unemployed and without health insurance, Verone simply saw no way other than
going to jail to get health care for a growth on his chest, foot difficulties,
and back problems.
Cost pressures
are building in ways that will also continue to undermine corporations facing
global competitors, forcing them to seek new solutions. A recent report from
the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“National Health
Expenditure Projections, 2009–2019”) projects health care costs to rise from
the 2010 level of 17.5 percent of GDP to 19.6 percent in 2019. It has long been
clear that the central question is to what extent, and at what pace, underlying
cost pressures ultimately force development of some form of single-payer
system—the only serious way to deal with the underlying problem.
A new national solution is ultimately
likely to come either in
response to a burst of pain-driven public outrage or more slowly through a state by state build up to a
national system. Massachusetts, of course, already has a near universal
plan, with 99.8 percent of children covered and 98.1 percent of adults. In
Hawaii, health coverage (provided mostly by nonprofit insurers) reaches 91.8
percent of adults in large part because of a 1970s law mandating low cost
insurance for anyone working twenty hours or more a week. In Vermont, Governor
Peter Shumlin signed legislation in May 2011 creating “Green Mountain Care,” a
broad effort that would ultimately allow state residents to move into a
publicly funded insurance pool—in essence a form of single-payer insurance.
Universal coverage, dependent on a federal waiver, would begin in 2017 and
possibly as early as 2014. In Connecticut, legislation approved in June 2011
created a “SustiNet” Health Care Cabinet directed to produce a business plan
for a nonprofit public health insurance program by 2012, with the goal of
offering such a plan beginning in 2014. In California, there is a good chance a
universal “Medicare for all” bill may be on the governor's desk for signature
by mid-2012. (Similar legislation passed by both the House and the Senate was
vetoed by then-Governor Schwarzenegger in 2006 and 2008.) In all, nearly twenty
states will soon consider bills to create one or another form of universal
health care.
One can also
observe a developing institutional dynamic in the central neighborhoods of some
of the nation's larger cities, places that have consistently suffered high
levels of unemployment and underemployment, with poverty commonly above 25
percent. In such neighborhoods, democratizing development has also gone
forward, again paradoxically, precisely because traditional policies—in this
case involving large expenditures for jobs, housing and other necessities—have
been politically impossible. “Social enterprises” that undertake businesses in
order to support specific social missions now increasingly make up what is
sometimes called “a fourth sector” (different from the government, business,
and nonprofit sectors). Roughly 4,500 not-for-profit community development
corporations are largely devoted to housing development. There are now also
more than eleven thousand businesses owned in whole or part by their employees;
five million more individuals are involved in these enterprises than are
members of private-sector unions. Another 130 million Americans are members of
various urban, agricultural, and credit union cooperatives. In many cities,
important new “land trust” developments are underway using an institutional
form of nonprofit or municipal ownership that develops and maintains low- and
moderate-income housing.
The various
institutional efforts have also begun to develop innovative strategies that
suggest broader possibilities for change. Consider the Evergreen Cooperatives
in Cleveland, Ohio, an integrated group of worker-owned companies, supported in
part by the purchasing power of large hospitals and universities. The cooperatives
include a solar installation company, an industrial scale (and ecologically
advanced) laundry, and soon a greenhouse capable of producing more than five
million heads of lettuce a year. The Cleveland effort, which is partly modeled
on the nearly 100,000 person Mondragón cooperatives in the Basque region of
Spain, is on track to create new businesses, year by year, as time goes on. However, its goal is not only simply worker
ownership, but also the
democratization of wealth and community-building in general in the low-income
Greater University Circle area of what was once a thriving industrial city.
Linked by a nonprofit corporation and a revolving fund, the companies cannot be
sold outside the network; they also return 10 percent of profits to help
develop additional worker-owned firms in the area. (Full disclosure: The
Democracy Collaborative, which I co-founded, has played an important role in
helping develop the Cleveland effort. See www.Community-Wealth.org for further
information on this and many other local and state efforts.)
Another
innovative enterprise is Market Creek Plaza in San Diego. There a
comprehensive, community-owned project links individual and collective
wealth-building through a $23.5-million commercial and cultural complex
anchored by a shopping center. The complex has developed a range of social and
economic projects that have resulted in the employment of more than 1,700
people. Its multicultural emphasis on the arts has helped create several venues
for common activity among the local Asian, Hispanic, and black communities.
Significantly, these collectively owned
businesses are commonly supported by unusual local alliances, including not only progressives; labor
unions; and nonprofit and religious leaders; but also, in many cases, the backing of local
businesses and bankers. The efforts have also attracted surprising
political support. In Indiana, for example, Republican State Treasurer Richard
Mourdock has established a state linked deposit program to provide state
financing support for employee ownership. At this writing, Ohio Democratic
Senator Sherrod Brown has plans to introduce model legislation to support the
development of an initial group of Evergreen-style efforts in diverse parts of
the country. Environmental concerns are also involved; many of the enterprises
are “green” by design, increasingly so as time goes on. Cleveland's Evergreen
laundry, which uses less than a third the amount of water used by comparable
commercial firms, is one of the most ecologically advanced in the Midwest. In
Washington state, Coastal Community Action (CCA) operates a portfolio of
housing, food, health, and employment programs for low-income residents that
uses development and ownership of a fourteen million dollar wind turbine to
generate income to support its social service programs.
Yet another
sphere of institutional growth centers on land development. By maintaining
direct ownership of areas surrounding transit station exits, public agencies in
Washington, DC, Atlanta, and other cities earn millions capturing the increased
land values their transit investments create. The town of Riverview, Michigan,
has been a national leader in trapping methane from its landfills and using it
to fuel electricity generation, thereby providing both revenues and jobs. There
are roughly five hundred similar projects nationwide. Many cities have
established municipally owned hotels. There are also over two thousand publicly
owned utilities that provide power (and, increasingly, broadband services) to
more than forty-five million Americans, in the process generating $50 billion
in annual revenue. Significant public institutions are also common at the state
level. CalPERS, California's public pension authority, helps finance local
community development needs; in Alaska, state oil revenues provide each citizen
with dividends from public investment strategies as a matter of right; in
Alabama, public pension investing has long focused on state economic
development (including employee-owned firms).
Altought public ownership is surprisingly widespread, it can also be vulnerable to challenge.
The fiscal crisis, and conservative resistance to raising taxes, has led some
mayors and governors to sell off public assets. In Indiana, Governor Mitch
Daniels sold the Indiana Toll Road to Spanish and Australian investors. In
Chicago, then-Mayor Richard Daley privatized parking meters and toll collection
on the Chicago Skyway and even proposed selling off recycling collection,
equipment maintenance, and the annual “Taste of Chicago” festival. How far
continuing financial and political pressures may lead other officials to
attempt to secure revenues by selling off public assets is an open question.
Public resistance to such strategies, although less widely publicized, has been
surprisingly strong in many areas. Toll road sales have been held up in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and newly elected Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel
recently voiced his opposition to an attempt to privatize Midway Airport as
previously attempted by Daley. An effort to transfer city-owned parking garages
to private ownership in Los Angeles also failed when residents and business
leaders realized parking rates would spike if the deal went through.
One thing is
certain: traditional liberalism, dependent on expensive federal policies and
strong labor unions, is moribund. The government no longer has much capacity to
use progressive taxation to achieve the goal of equity or to regulate
corporations effectively. Congressional deadlocks on such matters are the rule,
not the exception. At the same time, ongoing economic stagnation or mild
upturns followed by further decay, and “real” unemployment rates in the 15
percent to 16 percent range appear more likely than a return to booming
economic times.
Ironically, this
grim new order may open the way for the kinds of “evolutionary reconstructive”
institutional change described here. Since the Great Depression, liberal
activists and policy makers have implicitly assumed they were providing one or
another form of “countervailing power” against large corporations. But institutional reconstruction aims either to weaken or displace corporate power. Strategies
like anti-trust or efforts to “break up” big banks aim to weaken. Both Public banking, municipal utilities, and single-payer health plans attempt to displace
privately owned companies. At the same time, community-based enterprises
offer public officials alternatives to paying large tax-incentive bribes to big
corporations.
Of course,
“evolutionary reconstruction” might fail, as have most kinds of top-down
national reform. The era of stalemate and decay might continue and worsen. Like
ancient Rome, the United States could simply decline and fall, unable to
address its social ills.
However, even
during a sustained era of stalemate and decay, it may be possible to develop a
coherent long-term progressive strategic direction. Such a direction would
build upon the remaining energies of traditional liberal reform, animated over
time by new populist anger and movements aimed at confronting corporate power,
the extreme concentration of income, failing public services, the ecological
crisis, and military adventurism. And it would explicitly advocate the
construction of new institutions run by people committed to developing an
expansively democratic polity, thereby giving political voice to the new
constituencies emerging alongside the new developments at the same time it
helps to begin altering underlying institutional power balances.
In connection
with environmental issues, at least, some “capitalists” also seem willing to
sign onto this vision. New organizations like the Business Alliance for Local
Living Economies (BALLE) and the American Sustainable Business Council (ASBC)
have been quietly developing momentum in recent years. BALLE, which has more
than 22,000 small business members, works to promote sustainable local
community development. ASBC (which includes BALLE as a member) is an advocacy
and lobbying effort that involves more than 150,000 business professionals and
30 separate business organizations committed to sustainability. Leading White
House figures and such Cabinet-level officials as Labor Secretary Hilda Solis
have welcomed the organization as a counter to the national Chamber of
Commerce. (Jeffrey Hollender, chair of ASBC's Business Leadership Council and
former CEO of Seventh Generation, has denounced the Chamber for “fighting
democracy and destroying America's economic future” because of its opposition
to climate change legislation and its support for the Citizens United
decision.) Gus Speth, a member of ASBC's Advisory Board (and former
environmental adviser to Presidents Carter and Clinton) offers a more
far-reaching general perspective: “For the most part, we have worked within
this current system of political economy, but working within the system will
not succeed in the end when what is needed is transformative change in the
system itself.”
At the heart of
the spectrum of emerging institutional change is the traditional radical
principle that the ownership of capital should be subject to democratic
control. In a nation where 1 percent of the population owns nearly as much
wealth as the entire bottom half of the nation, this principle may be
particularly appealing to the young—the people who will shape the next
political era. In 2009, even as Republicans assailed President Obama and his
liberal allies as immoral “socialists,” a Rasmussen poll reported that
Americans under thirty were “essentially evenly divided” as to whether they
preferred “capitalism” or “socialism.” Even if many were unsure about what
“socialism” is, they were clearly open to something new, whatever it might be
called. A non-statist, community-building, institution-changing, democratizing
strategy might well capture their imagination and channel their desire to heal
the world. It is surely a positive direction to pursue. Just possibly, it could
open the way to an era of true progressive renewal, even one day perhaps
step-by-step systemic change or the kind of unexpected, explosive,
movement-building power evidenced in the “Arab Spring” and, historically, in
our own civil rights, feminist, and other great movements.
SUMBER: http://translate.google.co.id/translate?hl=id&sl=en&tl=id&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.neweconomyworkinggroup.org%2Farticle%2Fneither-revolution-nor-reform-new-strategy-left&anno=2
ARTINYA:
But what happens if a system neither reforms nor collapses in crisis?
Tapi apa yang terjadi jika sistem tidak reformasi atau runtuh dalam krisis?
A new national solution is ultimately
likely to come either in
response to a burst of pain-driven public outrage or more slowly through a state by state build up to a
national system.
Sebuah solusi nasional BARU pada akhirnya akan datang baik dalam
menanggapi ledakan sakit berbasis kemarahan publik atau lebih lambat
melalui sebuah negara oleh negara membangun hingga sistem nasional.
However, its goal is not only simply worker
ownership, but also the
democratization of wealth and community-building in general in the low-income
Greater University Circle area of what was once a thriving industrial city.
Namun, tujuannya bukan hanya kepemilikan pekerja, tetapi demokratisasi
kekayaan dan pembangunan masyarakat pada umumnya di daerah
berpenghasilan rendah yang lebih besar Lingkaran Universitas apa yang
pernah menjadi kota industri berkembang.
Significantly, these collectively owned
businesses are commonly supported by unusual local alliances, including not only progressives; labor
unions; and nonprofit and religious leaders; but also, in many cases, the backing of local
businesses and bankers.
Secara signifikan, bisnis ini secara kolektif dimiliki biasanya didukung
oleh aliansi lokal yang tidak biasa, termasuk tidak progresif saja;
serikat buruh, dan para pemimpin nirlaba dan keagamaan, tetapi juga,
dalam banyak kasus, dukungan dari bisnis lokal dan bankir.
But institutional reconstruction aims either to weaken or displace corporate power.
Tapi rekonstruksi kelembagaan bertujuan baik untuk melemahkan atau menggantikan kekuasaan korporasi.
Both Public banking, municipal utilities, and single-payer health plans attempt to displace
privately owned companies.
Dan juga perbankan publik, utilitas kota, dan single-pembayar kesehatan rencana upaya untuk menggantikan perusahaan swasta.
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar